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The Recalibration of the World and 
German Foreign Policy
Robert Kappel and Helmut Reisen
How should Germany position itself in a recalibrated world where China and India are 
becoming increasingly stronger actors? Since 2014, the People’s Republic of China has 
been practising a more assertive global financial diplomacy than before. Was does that 
mean for the strategic focus of German foreign policy between the poles of transatlantic 
commitments and the ever more assertive new powers?
Analysis
  On the international stage, an ever growing attractive power emanates from China. 
The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) of the BRICS countries 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the internationalisation of the 
renminbi, and the increasing importance of the BRICS group in the G20 and in global 
debates are some visible recent examples of the large-scale strategy of China and 
the other new regional powers of building multilateral institutions parallel to those 
dominated by the West. 
  The United States remains the world’s most important international actor, most 
important military world power, and second most important economic power after 
the European Union. Its influence and global charisma, however, are dwindling 
significantly.
  The European Union and Germany continue to be interested in a close cooperation 
with the United States, but the attraction of the transatlantic partnership is beginning 
to erode. The European Union has established numerous international ties, the most 
important of which are the strategic partnerships with China and India. 
  The European Union, however, is so far limited in its capability to provide global 
public goods and establish itself as a civil power.
Keywords:  Germany, European Union, India, United States, People’s Republic of China, 
international processes and tendencies, structural changes in the international 
system
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Pax Americana – and afterwards?
It is often suggested (and equally as often disput-
ed) that the Pax Americana is coming to an end. At 
least since the end of World War II, this term has 
been used to denote the international leadership 
position of the United States. The Bretton Woods 
institutions, the OECD, and NATO can be under-
stood as steering instruments under US leader-
ship. Unlike in the 1990s following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and its satellites, the world to-
day is no longer perceived as unipolar but rather 
as multipolar or apolar. The cohesive force of the 
United States has flagged, which is most evident 
in Africa and the Middle East. The Obama admin-
istration is neither succeeding in effectively com-
bating terrorism nor stemming the antagonistic 
leadership claims of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, or 
Egypt. The United States has to accept the further 
decline of its influence – namely, the erosion of its 
economic and military power and the attractive-
ness of the US model. Neither China nor India nor 
Russia has stepped into the breach; all three coun-
tries have only shown a limited degree of willing-
ness and ability to intervene in conflicts. Despite 
strong economic ties with the Middle East, the Eu-
ropean Union is not an autonomous bargaining 
political actor in the region; with the exception of 
Africa, this applies to all world regions.
The observed economic rise of China over the 
last three decades (Kappel 2011; Reisen 2013) and 
the delayed foreign policy engagement of China 
particularly within the scope of the BRICS group1 
and in global financial diplomacy (Wang 2014) 
are the basis of China’s international leadership 
claims. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the shift in glob-
al weight. The European Union remains the big-
gest economic area in the world, followed by the 
United States (Figure 1). Compared with the other 
countries under consideration, the United States is 
by far the richest country,2 followed by some dis-
tance by Europe and China; India, meanwhile, is 
even further behind (Figure 2). China, however, is 
catching up significantly as can be seen by its rath-
er high gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
(Figure 3) and its increasing per capita income. 
1  The BRICS group consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa.
2  Countries such as Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, Singa-
pore, and certain oil sheikhdoms have a higher per capita in-
come than the United States.
Figure 1: GDP* in USD millions, 2005–2013
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ent countries.
Source: World Bank, online: <http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator> (23 April 2015).
Figure 2: Per Capita Income (GNI-PPP*) in 
USD, 2005–2013
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Figure 3: GDP Growth Rate in Percent,  
2005–2013
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The data presented here suggest, albeit roughly, 
that China has become a prominent internation-
al actor; this, however, does not equally apply to 
India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, or 
Mexico. 
Meanwhile the cooperation between China, 
India, and Russia has intensified – despite these 
countries different views on many issues (security, 
climate, trade, the UN Security Council, the Rus-
sia–Ukraine conflict) – and that they along with 
the other BRICS countries are aiming for an al-
ternative model over a Western one. The reputa-
tion of the BRICS group has increased significant-
ly with this agenda. Increasingly, the BRICS coun-
tries are helping to shape global decisions. 
Benign Hegemons?
To what extent do China, the United States, India, 
and Germany still or already play the role of a “be-
nign hegemon”? Charles Kindleberger (1973, 1986) 
has worked out several key criteria for leadership 
power. According to its definition, a benign hege-
mon provides reliable regulatory systems and is 
thus recognised as a stabilising power that makes a 
contribution to peace. For Kindleberger, the adop-
tion of this role presupposes a willingness to ab-
sorb a disproportionate share of the costs for the 
stabilisation of the financial and economic system. 
A hegemon must have the power and capacity to 
fulfil this role and, in particular, ensure the follow-
ing conditions (Kindleberger 1973):
• acceptance of the open market so that exports 
from the crisis regions can be absorbed
• the countercyclical provision of long-term fi-
nancing
• a stable exchange rate system
• a willingness to serve as a “lender of last resort”
• the securing of macroeconomic and monetary 
policy coordination
• peaceful international relations
• a capacity to transform. 
A hegemon must be ready to lead, which it will on-
ly be able to manage – according to Kindleberger – 
through research achievements, high productivity, 
and mobility. Therefore, a hegemon must also be a 
leading economic power and have the capacity to 
develop politically and economically. 
Kindleberger argues that small countries do 
not possess such economic power, have negligi-
ble influence on the production of public goods, 
and bear no responsibility for the whole system. 
Nevertheless, when small countries collectively 
undertake “conscious parallel actions,” they can 
become powerful and oppose hegemons (Kindle-
berger 1981). Thus, collective actions can increase 
the “power of the powerless” (Narlikar 2015). 
Which role does the United States, China, Ger-
many, or India play in the provision of global pub-
lic goods in the financial and economic sector or 
in peacekeeping? Table 1 offers a schematic illus-
tration. 
Open markets
As a developing country, China – like India – is in-
terested in the construction and protection of new 
industries. Up to now, Germany and the United 
States have been classic free-trade nations despite 
their agricultural protectionism. Nonetheless, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
contradict the hitherto free-trade status of Germa-
ny and the United States by undermining the mul-
tilateral regulations of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and targeting the implementation of 
chiefly US norms and the containment of China.
Public Goods China Germany India United States
Open markets (X)  X 0 X
Long-term financing X (X) 0 0
Exchange rate stability (X) (X) (X) 0
Macroeconomic coordination 0 0 (X) X
Lender of last resort (X) 0 0 X
Peacekeeping 0 (X) 0 (X)
Capacity to transform X (X) (X) X
Table 1: Leadership Claims according to Kindleberger’s Criteria*
* X indicates positive; (X), mixed; 0, negative. 
Source: Own ratings.
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Long-term financing
With regard to the countercyclical provision of 
long-term financing, China is already considered 
to be exemplary. Since the end of the 1990s, Chi-
nese national financial institutions began to award 
developing countries generous development and 
export credit. China hereby secured a leader-
ship position, which has recently become stron-
ger through the setting up of parallel multilateral 
development banks (Heilmann et al. 2014; Sham-
baugh 2013). These financial institutions definitely 
have the potential to become serious competitors 
to the US-led World Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (Reisen 2015). India has not yet carried 
out any leadership responsibilities.
Through the KfW Development Bank, Germa-
ny at least has a well-equipped development bank 
and strongly participates in the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB). Nevertheless, within the scope 
of the eurozone, Germany has impeded both fiscal 
union and shared government bonds and has de-
clined to take on a constructive leadership role de-
spite its significant financial contributions to vari-
ous aid packages. 
The United States stands out rather as a pro-
moter of pro-cyclical financing, especially through 
the emphasis on private portfolio investments and 
the omnipresent pressure to cut back on capital 
controls.
Exchange rate stability
Since suspending convertibility of the US dollar in-
to gold and the collapse of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates, US Federal Reserve 
monetary policy has been avowedly guided by na-
tional objectives; global monetary policy leader-
ship has been surrendered. With its de facto peg-
ging of the renminbi to the US dollar, China has 
prevented a global currency war, since the Bank of 
Japan and the European Central Bank (ECB) have 
been deliberately weakening the external value 
of their currencies. In this respect, China is (still) 
showing global responsibility.
Germany plays a mixed role with regard to 
the preservation of the eurozone. Together with 
France, Germany has violated criteria defined in 
the Maastricht Treaty and has prevented the EU 
Commission from launching sanctions proceed-
ings. More important, however, is that Germany 
has actively torpedoed the creation of institutional 
preconditions for a functioning monetary union – 
namely, fiscal and banking union as well as a com-
mon market for government bonds.
Macroeconomic coordination
Here the United States remains the undisputed 
leading power – for example, within the context of 
the G20 it pushes for macroeconomic coordination 
and the reduction of external imbalances (beggar-
my-neighbour policies in the form of large current 
account surpluses). In China and Germany, a neo-
mercantlist mindset and ignorance of the Keynesian 
circular-flow model prevent an understanding of 
the need for global macroeconomic coordination.
Lender of last resort
Internationally, the US Federal Reserve continues 
to play the most important role of lender of last 
resort in instances of worldwide systemic finan-
cial crises. Due to underdeveloped financial mar-
kets and existing controls on capital movements, 
the People’s Bank of China cannot play this role. 
Nonetheless, China’s significant foreign exchange 
reserves and public finances were vigorously used 
during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis to effec-
tively prevent a slump in economic performance.
Peacekeeping
The United States has lost its capacity to operate 
as a global peacemaker. The civil wars in Syria and 
Iraq, the rise of Islamic State (IS), and the incapac-
ity to invigorate the democratic movement in the 
Middle East point to the limits of US hard and soft 
power. Many observers interpret this as a sign of 
the relative decline of the United States. In regions 
without clear leadership power – such as the Mid-
dle East – new power constellations are develop-
ing, which are evidenced by ever fiercer conflict 
between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt 
(Fürtig 2014). 
China, which apart from in UN missions has 
barely performed as a world actor in peace pro-
cesses or conflict regions, is not yet able or willing 
to follow in the footsteps of the United States. With 
the exception of its ties with neighbouring states, 
China must be seen as a “hesitant hegemon” that 
strictly adheres to the principals of the United Na-
tions – that is, non-intervention and non-interfer-
ence (Noesselt 2015). India is, except for activities 
in its immediate neighbourhood, generally not in-
clined to function as a stabiliser or capable of do-
ing so.
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Capacity to transform 
The United States continues to show a great ca-
pacity for transformation, followed by Germa-
ny and the European Union. The United States is 
equipped with the best universities and research 
institutes, it develops its total factor productivity3 
more quickly than all other countries, and it has 
high levels of immigration. However, China – in 
particular – is drawing increasingly closer to the 
level of the West, is developing transformation ca-
pacities, and is thus increasingly exerting econom-
ic power. India is in every respect a straggler.
In addition to testing in accordance with the 
Kindleberger criteria, it is necessary to ask what 
influence the United States, China, India, and Ger-
many have on the resolution of numerous inter-
national trouble spots and hazardous situations. 
These shall be examined in relation to eight glob-
al challenges faced by the international communi-
ty (Table 2). It should be pointed out, however, that 
the direction in which the respective governments 
have acted to resolve the individual political con-
flict areas is indicated in a rather unsophisticated 
manner.
The United States and China have only shown a 
moderate interest in making conceptual and finan-
cial contributions for a global climate regime. In-
dia is virtually irrelevant in this context. As a con-
sequence, it is unlikely that a generally binding cli-
mate regime will be implemented in the near fu-
ture. The degree to which other options come into 
play depends on, inter alia, the willingness to es-
tablish climate clubs that agree on objectives and 
implement measures – of which sanctions would 
form part (Betz and Never 2015). 
3 Total factor productivity is a measure of productivity. It 
indicates which part of the growth of production cannot be 
attributed to a growth in the use of production factors (labour 
and capital) but rather to technical progress.
With regard to migration policy, the United States, 
as an immigration country, has a completely dif-
ferent starting position than does China or India – 
neither of which are yet to really address the chal-
lenges presented by refugee movements or tack-
ling the causes of refugee flight. By contrast, the 
European Union is facing huge challenges due to 
the civil wars in the neighbouring regions of the 
Middle East, North and West Africa, and East-
ern Europe; the fleeing of hundreds of thousands 
of people from terrorist groups; and the financial 
and social crises in Africa and the Middle East – 
all of which have so far only been addressed with 
inadequate measures. Even so, in the European 
Union and individual EU member states, there is 
a willingness to receive hundreds of thousands of 
refugees. 
The fight against IS and other terrorist organ-
isations is led entirely, even if half-heartedly, by 
the United States – though sometimes in coopera-
tion with other European countries (such as France 
in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria). The 
United States also has allies in the European Union 
when addressing the crisis in Afghanistan and the 
conflict in Ukraine, or rather Russia’s conduct. The 
European Union, especially the German govern-
ment, is ready to take part in negotiations to avoid 
an escalation of the Ukraine crisis. In contrast, nei-
ther China nor India has offered any concepts or 
concrete measures in this field. The same applies 
to the disintegration process in Libya.
Overall, it can be said that in the aforemen-
tioned conflict areas, the United States has as-
sumed a less hegemonic role than ever; they have 
rather taken a back seat. Despite this, neither Ger-
many, nor the European Union, nor Russia, nor 
even the rising power of China has taken the Unit-
ed State’s place. The resulting vacuum is unlike-
ly to be filled. In the escalating geopolitical situ-
Public Goods China Germany India United States
Climate policy (X) (X) 0 (X)
Migration and refugee movements 0 (X) 0 (X)
IS terror 0 0 0 (X)
Peacekeeping mission in Mali 0 (X) 0 (X)
Collapse of Libya 0 0 0 (X)
Iranian nuclear programme 0 (X) 0 (X)
Crisis in Afghanistan 0 (X) 0 X
Ukraine–Russia crisis 0 X 0 (X)
Table 2: Influence and Leadership Ability*
* X indicates positive; (X), mixed; 0, negative. 
Source:  Own surveys; Betz and Never 2015; Destradi 2014; Destradi and Jakobeit 2015; Fürtig 2014; Never and Betz 
2014; Noesselt 2015.
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ation and following the further collapse of coun-
tries (South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Syria) 
certain regional leading powers have attempted to 
increase their influence – for example, Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia – without, however, having the ca-
pacities to address the challenges posed by terror-
ism and state failure (Fürtig 2014).
The Role of Germany and Europe
Given the obvious weakness of the international 
community, the question is how Germany and the 
European Union should position themselves. Here 
it is important to note that in recent years Europe’s 
scope for action has been severely constrained 
not only by relative economic stagnation but also, 
above all, by crises in the eurozone and emerging 
political crises (Ukraine–Russia and the Middle 
East). On the one hand, Europe´s weak stance is 
due to internal disputes as well as different nation-
al interests. On the other hand, the provision of 
global public goods are significant challenges that 
cannot be resolved solely by the European Union. 
Therefore, no adequate cooperation strategy has 
been offered in reply to Russia’s geostrategic ac-
tion (for example, with the creation of the Eurasian 
Union) or the collective actions of the BRICS group, 
in which Russia plays an important role. 
It is a similar situation with regard to the 
actions of China and India, which are so far 
unwilling and unable to provide global public 
goods in either Afghanistan or Iran (Destradi und 
Jakobeit 2015). Also in the scope of the strategic 
partnerships between the European Union and 
Germany, on the one hand, and India and China, 
on the other, there is a lack of shared concepts, 
capacities, and financial resources to address the 
above-mentioned conflicts. In Germany itself, 
the strategies with which the federal government 
plans to reposition itself in terms of foreign policy 
and to assume greater international responsibility 
have not yet been developed.
Thus the questions arise as to how Germany 
as an individual actor within the European Union 
will lead internationally and assume responsibili-
ty, and with which allies Germany can and will at-
tempt to shape the regional and global order. Ger-
many has economic power, shaping power, and a 
positive image; Germany’s economic model and 
its concept of the civilian exercise of power are em-
phasised as being especially characteristic of Ger-
many (Jakobeit et al. 2010; Kappel 2014). Decisive 
is, however, where Germany positions itself and 
where it in actual fact engages creatively.
These questions of a new German foreign pol-
icy perspective have been put up for discussion.4 
The German government is increasingly growing 
into the role of a “well-intentioned hegemon,” is 
playing an active role within the scope of the Eu-
ropean Union, and is ready to take on more glob-
al responsibility. Germany is evidently changing 
from a (geo)economic power into a European key 
actor that is gaining profile through its coopera-
tion with European governments, its close cooper-
ation with China, its involvement in the Ukraine–
Russia conflict, and its global policies.
However, Germany still lacks the capacity for 
action, which is shown by its nondescript poli-
cies towards Africa and the Middle East, among 
other things; strategic action is not yet recogni-
sable (Kappel 2014). That similarly applies to the 
conflict-marked transatlantic cooperation (TTIP, 
Ukraine, accession of several European countries 
to the AIIB). A redefinition of the North Atlantic 
policy between the United States and the Europe-
an Union is at the moment not forthcoming. 
Presently, doubts about Germany’s capacity 
to act as a well-intentioned hegemon still prevail. 
Günther Maihold, a political scientist and deputy 
director of the German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs (SWP), justifiably asks: “How 
can German foreign policy free itself from being 
too opportunistic, ad hoc, and reactive oriented?” 
(Maihold 2014: 48). As the political scientist Hanns 
Maull (2014) explains, Germany has to upgrade its 
foreign policy and finally fulfil European and in-
ternational expectations. This would require the 
resolution of numerous problems – for example, 
the legitimation of German foreign policy – and a 
commitment to the establishment of the European 
Union as a foreign policy actor; Germany should 
exert its influence through its role model function 
and not through hegemony. 
German decision-makers know how little Ger-
many can alter the coordinates of politics beyond 
Europe. They also know that in the global political 
arena, there are many actors with different ideas 
who talk, negotiate, and block so that it is virtu-
ally impossible to show real leadership and suc-
4 See the final report of the Review 2014 process, Federal For-
eign Office (2015), Review 2014 – Krise – Ordnung – Europa, on-
line: <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Review2014/Ue-
berblick/Text_node.html> (4 May 2015).
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cessfully steer. China is still only a “partial power” 
in the world community (Shambaugh 2013; No-
esselt 2015), but the coordinates of world politics 
are manifestly changing. The world is being reca-
librated. China, India, and the other BRICS coun-
tries distinguish themselves through their capacity 
and will to influence regional and international de-
velopment. Once German policy anticipates these 
developments and develops instruments which 
take these shifts into account, exploits its capacities 
to address global challenges, and attempts to push 
through global and regional solutions with other 
EU allies or middle-sized powers, then can Germa-
ny and Europe improve their damaged image as 
an economic core of the world economy, as a mod-
el of prosperity, and as a civil power and avoid be-
ing seen as hesitant actors on the periphery.
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